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INTRODUCTION
With trillions of dollars in assets, sovereign wealth funds
("SWFs") play a major role in financial markets around the world.
With billions of (and probably well over a trillion) dollars' worth of
equity investments around the world,' the investment behavior of
SWFs is of primary concern to regulators, portfolio firms, and other
investors. The routinely cited perils of sovereign investment, such
as politicization, corporate espionage, and mercantilism, are
typically seen as emanating from equity investments by SWFs. 2 On
the other hand, SWFs offer the promise of patient, sustainable
investment by engaged stewards who take a long view of the impact
of their investments.
This Article seeks to provide a realistic appraisal of the benefits
and potential costs of SWF investment for other investors. Most
work on SWF investment has focused on the challenges that SWFs
present to regulators, portfolio companies, or their own domestic
constituencies. 3  Although a few studies have examined SWF
investment price impacts,4 SWF analyses have tended to ignore the
effect of SWF investment on other investors. What, if anything, do
* Bazler Designated Professor in Business Law, Moritz College of Law,
Ohio State University.
1. Sudip Kar-Gupta, Sovereign Funds' Selling Could Hit $700 Bln of
European Stocks, REUTERS (Feb. 10, 2016, 10:51 AM), http://www.reuters.com
/article/europe-stocks-sovereign-idUSL8N15O3WX (citing J.P. Morgan analyst
Nikolaos Panigirtzoglou's estimate that "oil producers' funds hold around $2
trillion of publicly listed equities worldwide").
2. See, e.g., Paul Rose, Sovereign Investing and Corporate Governance:
Evidence and Policy, 18 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 913, 920, 946 (2013)
[hereinafter Rose, Sovereign Investing and Corporate Governance].
3. See, e.g., Simone Mezzacapo, The So-called "Sovereign Wealth Funds":
Regulatory Issues, Financial Stability and Prudential Supervision, in EUROPEAN
ECONOMY (European Comm'n, Directorate Gen. for Econ. & Fin. Affairs,
Economic Papers No. 378, 2009), http://ec.europa.eu/economy-finance
/publications/pages/publicationl5064_en.pdf.
4. See, e.g., Jason Kotter & Ugur Lel, Friends or Foes? Target Selection
Decisions of Sovereign Wealth Funds and Their Consequences, 101 J. FIN. EcoN.
360 (2011).
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SWFs owe to other investors? This Article calls for sovereign
investors to recognize the special responsibilities they have to co-
investors. While these responsibilities may not constitute actionable
fiduciary duties, SWFs should embrace a model of transparent,
engaged ownership that will benefit their co-investors and their
common portfolio companies.
This Article first outlines the concept of fiduciary duties
generally and describes the way that such duties (or their civil law
equivalents) impact SWF governance. Next, it addresses the
complex question of the object of SWF duties. The sponsor
government, at least, has claim to these duties, but what of other
impacted constituencies, such as citizens? This Article then turns to
the issue of investor obligations and notes that while investors
typically do not owe one another fiduciary duties, they can mutually
benefit by minimizing costs for one another through adhering to
basic principles of transparency and predictable investment
behavior. Lastly, this Article evaluates the ability of the Santiago
Principles to encourage this kind of transparency and predictability
through a review of recently completed SWF self-assessments of
compliance with the Santiago Principles.
I. SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS AND FIDUCIARY DUTY
The idea of "fiduciary duties" as a standard of conduct for
investment managers is well known in the Western world,
particularly in common law jurisdictions. In the United States, for
example, the 1830 case Harvard College v. Armory5 required
trustees "to observe how men of prudence, discretion and
intelligence manage their own affairs . . . ."6 Later, the Restatement
(Third) of Trusts updated the standard to require a trustee to
"administer the trust as a prudent person would, in light of the
purposes, terms, and other circumstances of the trust[,]" 7 with
"reasonable care, skill, and caution."8 Trustees are bound not only
by this duty of care but also by a strict duty of loyalty that requires
them to "administer the trust solely in the interest of the
beneficiaries,"9 prohibits self-dealing transactions,10 and obligates
fair dealing and full disclosure of "all material facts the trustee
knows or should know" to the beneficiaries."
5. 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 (1830).
6. Id. at 461.
7. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 77(1) (AM. LAW. INST. 2007).
8. Id. § 77(2).
9. Id. § 78(1).
10. Id. § 78(2).
11. Id. § 78(3).
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Fiduciary duties-if not in name, at least in effect-are not
unique to the West. The roots of modern-day fiduciary duties run
deep and wide, through "[a]lmost every ancient law across many
different [civilizations] . . . ."12 One finds these roots stretching back
to medieval English trust law, fifth-century Islamic family law,
fourth-century Roman inheritance law, the teachings of Confucius
(551-479 BC), and the Code of Hammurabi (circa 1790 BC).13 Yet
outside of common law jurisdictions, one is less likely to refer to
"fiduciary obligations" as such. For example, what one might label a
fiduciary duty in a common law jurisdiction may be defined by a
civil law jurisdiction as a contractual or statutory arrangement due
to their imposition of similar obligations.1 4 As stated in a European
Union report:
Common law jurisdictions tend to operationalize fiduciary
relationships through trusts and provide greater interpretive
discretion to judges, while civil law countries are likely to use
a contractual arrangement with a financial institution or
management company and focus more on specific regulatory
guidance than principles. This does not mean that fiduciary
duty does not exist in civil law. The concept of fiduciary duty
is present in the legislation of every EU Member State as
similar specific obligations to institutional investors. 15
SWFs, defined here as special purpose investment funds that
are owned by the general government, 16 are generally non-Western
entities created in jurisdictions that do not have a common law
tradition of fiduciary duty. This fact appears to be reflected in the
recent self-assessments of compliance with the Santiago Principles
(or, as the Santiago Principles are more formally known, the
Generally Accepted Principles and Practices).17 While not referring
explicitly to fiduciary duties, Principle 8 states that "[t]he governing
body(ies) should act in the best interests of the SWF, and have a
12. ERIC MUGNIER ET AL., RESOURCE EFFICIENCY AND FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF
INVESTORS 22 (2014), http://ec.europa.eu/environment/enveco/resource-efficiency
/pdflFiduciaryDuties.pdf.
13. KEITH L. JOHNSON, INT'L INST. FOR SUSTAINABLE DEV., INTRODUCTION TO
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR FIDUCIARY DUTIES 2 (2014),
http://www.reinhartlaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Introduction-to
-Institutional-Investor-Fiduciary-Duties.pdf.
14. MUGNIER ET AL., supra note 12, at 8.
15. Id. at 22.
16. This definition, set out by the International Working Group of
Sovereign Wealth Funds, is not uncontested. See, e.g., JAVIER CAPAPA & TOMAS
GUERRERO, MORE LAYERS THAN AN ONION: LOOKING FOR A DEFINITION OF
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS 2 (2013), http://fletcher.tufts.edu/SovereigNet
/ResearchlMore-Layers-Than-an-Onion.
17. Id. at 8.
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clear mandate and adequate authority and competency to carry out
its functions."' 8  Of the twenty-nine funds that provided self-
assessments, only three mentioned the term "fiduciary" at all in
their discussion of how they comply with Principle 8.19 Searching
for explicit "fiduciary duties" in the publicly available policies
governing SWF managers' conduct also produces few results. Of the
twenty-five largest SWFs in the world, only eight disclose that they
follow some sort of fiduciary duty or prudent investor standard. 20
Even of these eight, only a few operationalize what a U.S.
investment manager would recognize as U.S.-style fiduciary
duties. 21
Even if not explicitly adopting fiduciary standards, many, if not
all, SWFs operate in accordance with the basic tenets of loyalty and
due care that underlie the Western conceptualization of fiduciary
duty. China Investment Corporation ("CIC"), for example, states
that it "is committed to being a prudent, professional and
responsible institutional investor operating globally with good
reputation." 22 It operates in accordance with four principles:
* [I]nvest on a commercial basis ... [and] seek maximum
returns for [its] shareholder [the Chinese government]
within acceptable risk tolerance.
* [Act as] a financial investor and do not seek control of
[portfolio companies].
* [Act as] a responsible investor, abiding by the laws and
regulations of China and recipient countries and
consciously fulfilling . . . corporate social responsibilities.
* [P]ursue investments based on in-depth research within
[its] asset allocation framework to ensure a prudent and
disciplined decision-making process. 23
18. INT'L WORKING GRP. OF SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS, SOVEREIGN WEALTH
FUNDS: GENERALLY ACCEPTED PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES: "SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES"
7 (2008) [hereinafter SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES], http://www.ifswf.org/sites/default
/files/santiagoprinciplesOO.pdf.
19. The three funds are the Agaciro Development Fund (Rwanda), Kazanah
Nasional Berhad (Malaysia), and the Pula Fund (Botswana). See Santiago
Principle Self-Assessments, INT'L F. SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS,
http://www.ifswf.orglassessments (last visited Oct. 25, 2017).
20. Paul Rose, Public Funds Investment Policies: 2016 Survey 10 (Ohio
State Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 376, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract id=2917871 [hereinafter Rose, Public Funds Investment
Policies: 2016 Survey].
21. Id.
22. Investment Philosophies, CHINA INV. CORP., http://www.china-inv.cn/wps
/portal/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2017) (select "EN" for English, then follow
"Investments" and "Investment Philosophies" hyperlinks to access source).
2 3. Id.
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One could characterize a "prudent" and "disciplined decision-
making process" and a focus on maximum returns as creating a
similar obligation to the core fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.
The general animus of fiduciary duties in common law jurisdictions
is to limit the agency costs of vulnerable beneficiaries by requiring
strict standards of conduct for fiduciaries. 24 Similarly, fiduciary
duties limit the information asymmetries between the principal-
beneficiaries and the agent-trustees. 25 In the general case in which
fiduciary duties are written in by the law as a standard form
contract, efficiency dictates that the government-through common
law or by statute-supply that standard contract. Beneficiaries face
risks relative to the trustee, such as a lack of information or the
ability to understand the information received or a collective action
problem that impairs the ability of a group of beneficiaries from
adequately monitoring a trustee. These typical concerns may seem
to be mitigated when the beneficiary is a sophisticated sovereign.
For example, one might expect that the Chinese government is quite
capable of policing agency costs within the CIC. Yet conflicts of
interest, shirking, and corruption can arise even in well-managed
funds,26 and fiduciary duties (or their statutory equivalents) can
play an important role in setting out appropriate standards of
conduct as well as penalties for failure to meet the standards. 27
Thus far, this Article has noted how most SWFs do not operate
under a common law tradition that imposes fiduciary duties on
trustees. However, SWFs generally do employ governance
structures that require diligence in how investments are selected,
accountability for investment outcomes, and restrictions on
transactions that have the potential to create a conflict of interest. 28
Whether fiduciary-like obligations are created by the courts,
statutes, rules, or procedures of the SWF, the governance output
may be the same. The differences in governance quality do not
depend so much on the type of structure as much as the quality of
the institutions that monitor and enforce fund governance. But
regardless of the mechanisms that supply the governance-the
"how" of fund governance-we must still ask, as Justice Frankfurter
24. See TAMAR FRANKEL, 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS
AND THE LAW 127-28 (defining "fiduciary duties").
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., Philipp Hildebrand, The Challenge of Sovereign Wealth Funds,
VOX (Jan. 21, 2008), http://voxeu.org/article/challenge-sovereign-wealth-funds.
27. FRANKEL, supra note 24.
28. See Rose, Public Funds Investment Policies: 2016 Survey, supra note 20,
at 12.
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did, the "who" questions of fund governance: For whom does the
fund manager work? To whom does the fund manager owe duties? 29
An initial answer is that the fund should be managed on behalf
of the government. However, this question can be surprisingly
complicated as one asks whether the government is, in turn, an
intermediary merely managing on behalf of another group. For
example, does the government manage the fund on behalf of the
elites? Hatton and Pistor argue that, in the case of many SWFs,
"the ruling elite utilize SWFs to secure their domestic political
dominance against both internal and external threats."30
Alternatively, a government may manage the fund assets on
behalf of its people as a "fiduciary state."31 Who are the "people"
that are the beneficiaries of this management? Citizens?
Residents? Voters? Taxpayers? Current and future generations, or
just future generations, seeing as some SWFs are designed to
compensate future generations for the loss of income from the
current generation's sale of natural resources? The very concept of a
fiduciary state is controversial. Normally, one thinks of fiduciary
duties in an investment context as existing to "ensure that those
who manage other people's money act in the interests of
beneficiaries." 32 But is sovereign wealth the wealth of the people?
The issue has arisen in the United States after the State of
Alaska decided to tax the dividend checks paid to Alaskan citizens
out of the Alaska Permanent Fund's returns.33  The Alaska
Permanent Fund was created in 1976 to invest a portion of the
income generated from all mineral lease rentals, royalties, and other
related payments received by the state. 34 At issue in Beattie v.
United StateS35 was whether the state could tax a dividend paid out
of income generated from such proceeds. 36 The plaintiff-citizen
argued that the dividend payments are "neither the fruits of labor or
capital, nor are they 'income' in the layman's sense of the word" and
29. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943) ("To
say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis; it gives direction to further
inquiry. To whom is he a fiduciary? What obligations does he owe as a
fiduciary? In what respect has he failed to discharge these obligations? And
what are the consequences of his deviation from his duty?").
30. Kyle Hatton & Katharina Pistor, Maximizing Autonomy in the Shadow
of Great Powers: The Political Economy of Sovereign Wealth Funds, 50 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1, 1, 3 (2011).
31. See Dan Purves, Sovereigns Versus Citizens, TOP1000FUNDS.COM (Apr.
20, 2017), https://www.topl000funds.com/analysis/2017/04/20/sovereigns-versus
-citizens/.
32. MUGNIER ET AL., supra note 12, at 19.
33. Beattie v. United States, 635 F. Supp. 481, 484 (D. Alaska 1986).
34. Id. at 482.
35. 635 F. Supp. 481 (D. Alaska 1986).
36. Id. at 485.
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that "the Permanent Fund dividend payments are not from an
outside or third-party source since it is the people's natural
resources . . . ."37 The U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska
was not convinced. It held that
[n]either the resources in question, nor the proceeds from the
same, nor the income from those proceeds, are the "property"
of any person who resides in the State of Alaska. As [plaintiff]
argues, the people in some very real sense do have ultimate
sovereignty and are the ultimate masters of the state. But
that does not make the people the "owners" of that property
which is the subject of this discussion. In adopting their
constitution, the people of the State of Alaska have very
clearly constituted the state as owner of the natural resources
which give rise to the fund in question.3 8
However, the fact that the State of Alaska, rather than the
people of Alaska, was held to "own" the property in question does
not necessarily negate the fiduciary character of the state. For
example, although one typically sees a fiduciary managing property
owned by the beneficiary-such as the management of a retirement
account by an investment manager-this is not always the case.
One would not consider the pension fund beneficiary to own the
underlying assets managed on her behalf by a pension fund trustee,
yet it is without question that the trustee owes fiduciary duties to
the pensioner. 39 The court in Beattie noted that language in the
Alaska Constitution stressed the state's ownership rights 40 but also
cited section 2, which mandates that "[t]he legislature shall provide
for the utilization, development, and conservation of all natural
resources belonging to the State, including land and waters, for the
maximum benefit of its people."41 Although the property may not be
owned by the people-and so the fiduciary relationship between the
sovereign and the people may not be as direct as that of an
investment manager managing other people's money-the state may
still be considered a fiduciary in the same way that a corporate
pension fund's trustees are the fiduciaries of the fund's
beneficiaries. 4 2
37. Id. at 491.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 489.
40. Id. at 491 (citing ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 1 ("It is the policy of the
State to encourage the settlement of its land and the development of its
resources by making them available for maximum use consistent with the
public interest." (emphasis added))).
41. Id. at 491-92 (citing ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 2).
42. Whether a public pension fund is a fiduciary in the same sense as a
corporate fund is not a simple question and is discussed in detail in Paul Rose,
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The argument for SWFs and their state sponsors as fiduciaries
has been made forcefully by Cummine, who contends that
governments, as creators and sponsors of SWFs, should be subject to
a fiduciary-like obligation to "act in the interests of the domestic
community in establishing, managing and using an SWF."43 SWFs
should guard against conflicts of interest, and "[a]ny attempt by
government or state agencies to exert control over sovereign wealth
in a manner that serves their own interests (or the interests of some
narrowly defined group within a domestic community) rather than
the interests of the community at large would be inimical to this
principle."44 Cummine's principle of a fiduciary state thus runs
counter to Hatton and Pistor's explanation that SWFs exist to
maximize the interests of the elite.45
The fiduciary-state model of SWF governance does not resolve
the central question of this Article-what responsibilities do SWFs
have to other investors-but, as will be discussed in subsequent
Parts, the governance mechanisms it engenders have a deep impact
on the ability of other investors to monitor and evaluate SWF
behavior. The concept of the SWF as a mechanism of the fiduciary
state focuses on a view that SWFs have responsibilities to citizens
that should shape their governance policies and processes. This
Article seeks to expand that view to show that although SWFs may
only be bound strictly to their sponsor government in terms of
actionable duties (excepting, of course, legal duties arising from
their voluntary participation in markets), 46 they are yet tied to
many other constituencies in ways that imply important
responsibilities for SWFs if they are to develop as long-term, trusted
investors in international markets. The governance policies and
processes that benefit citizen-beneficiaries also serve to benefit the
SWF's co-investors.
Public Wealth Maximization: A New Framework for Public Fund Fiduciary
Duties, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (concluding that public pension
funds owe duties to the state and the public generally rather than merely to
individual beneficiaries).
43. ANGELA CUMMINE, CITIZENS' WEALTH: WHY (AND How) SOVEREIGN FUNDS
SHOULD BE MANAGED BY THE PEOPLE FOR THE PEOPLE 55-56 (2016).
44. Id.
45. Note, however, that Hatton and Pistor are making a descriptive claim,
rather than a normative claim. Cummine's claim may be descriptive for some
funds, but it is intended as a normative claim for SWFs, generally.
46. See Ingilab Ahmadov et al., Sovereign Wealth Funds As the Emerging
Players in the Global Financial Arena: Characteristics, Risks and Governance,
in SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS: NEW CHALLENGES FOR THE CASPIAN COUNTRIES 6,
10-14 (2011), https://resourcegovernance.org/sites/default/files/SWFs-Caspian
-Countries.pdf.
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II. WHAT Do INVESTORS OWE ONE ANOTHER?
Before asking what SWFs might owe to other investors, we
must first briefly outline what the law says generally about
investors' duties. It is well-accepted under U.S. law that
shareholders have the right to selfish ownership of their shares. 47
In limited circumstances, however, the law holds certain investors to
a high standard.48 In particular, "controlling insiders are fiduciaries
toward the non-controlling shareholders in regard to the manner in
which control is exercised."49  Even this doctrine has limits,
however. As Bainbridge notes, "while corporate law ensures that
the majority may not benefit itself at the expense and to the
exclusion of the minority, corporate law does not require the
majority affirmatively to benefit the minority at its own expense.
There simply is no corporate law version of affirmative action."50
But what about non-controlling shareholders? We assume that
they are free to buy, sell, and vote however they choose and do not
owe any duty to other shareholders. Because they do not control the
corporate machinery, there would seem to be no general concern
that they could use the resources of the corporation to benefit
themselves at the expense of the remaining shareholders-a core (if
not the core) concern in corporate law. 51 Other scholars have argued
otherwise. In an influential article, Anabtawi and Stout suggest
that as shareholders become more active in corporate governance,
more attention should be paid to both the manner in which they
exercise their influence and the goals that they are trying to
achieve:
[E]ven as shareholders are becoming more powerful, their
interests are becoming more heterogeneous. Increasingly, the
economic interests of one shareholder or shareholder group
conflict with the economic interests of others. The result is
47. See, e.g., Med. Air Tech. Corp. v. Marwan Inv., Inc., 303 F.3d 11, 21 (1st
Cir. 2002); Butler v. Moore, No. 10-10207-FDS, 2015 WL 1409676, *60 (D.
Mass. Mar. 26, 2015); Pointer v. Castellani, 918 N.E.2d 805, 816 (Mass. 2009).
48. See Alfred Hill, The Sale of Controlling Shares, 70 HARV. L. REV. 986,
1034 (1957); see also A.A. Berle, Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44
HARv. L. REV. 1049, 1049 (1931); Daniel S. Kleinberger, Donahue's Fils Ain:
Reflections on Wilkes and the Legitimate Rights of Selfish Ownership, 33 W.
NEW ENG. L. Rev. 405, 409-10 n.22, 412-13 (2011).
49. Hill, supra note 48, at 1014.
50. Stephen M. Bainbridge, There Is No Affirmative Action for Minorities,
Shareholder and Otherwise, in Corporate Law, 118 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 71,
75 (2008).
51. See, e.g., In re USACafes, L.P. Litig., 600 A.2d 43, 48 (Del. Ch. 1991)
("[O]ne who controls property of another may not, without implied or express
agreement, intentionally use that property in a way that benefits the holder of
the control to the detriment of the property or its beneficial owner.").
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that activist shareholders are using their growing influence
not to improve overall firm performance, as has generally been
assumed, but to profit at other shareholders' expense. 52
In other work, I have argued in support of the view that
shareholders have heterogeneous interests and will often pursue
interests that are adverse to other shareholders.5 3 This problem can
be highlighted by focusing on the various agency relationships at
work in corporations. Let us first assume that the corporation in
question is a large, publicly traded corporation with a wide group of
shareholders, including both retail and institutional investors. The
primary agency and duty relationship at work in the corporation is
that of managers (by which I mean both directors and senior
corporate officers) to shareholders.54 These shareholders will likely
include a variety of institutional investors, including pension funds,
insurance companies, mutual funds, retail investors, and perhaps
even hedge fund investors.5 5
52. Iman Anabtawi & Lynn A. Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist
Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1258 (2008).
53. See generally Paul Rose, Common Agency and the Public Corporation,
63 VAND. L. REV. 1353 (2010) [hereinafter Rose, Common Agency and the Public
Corporation].
54. I acknowledge but do not discuss the potential concern that a board of
directors is not, as Stephen Bainbridge notes, a "mere agent of the
shareholders, but rather is a sui generis body-a sort of Platonic guardian-
serving as the nexus of the various contracts making up the corporation."
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate
Governance 6 (UCLA, Sch. Of Law, Research Paper No. 02-06, 2002),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=300860. This
characterization may be a fair reading of some Delaware precedent yet fails to
take in account the clear signaling by Delaware courts that corporations are to
be managed for the benefit of shareholders. No less an authority than
Delaware Supreme Court Justice Leo Strine states that "the corporate law
requires directors, as a matter of their duty of loyalty, to pursue a good faith
strategy to maximize profits for the stockholders." Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our
Continuing Struggle with the Idea that For-Profit Corporations Seek Profit, 47
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 155 (2012). The continuing focus on aligning
interests in compensation arrangements is, in practice, designed to support this
notion. As a descriptive (and not normative) matter, it would seem increasingly
challenging to sustain the view that directors do not function as the agents of
shareholders.
55. Strine, supra note 54, at 144.
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Directors / Managers
Shareholders
A standard representation of this relationship, as shown above,
has the managers, as agents, serving the shareholders as a group.
In this simple formulation, the flow of fiduciary duties appears
uncomplicated and linear. In the modern corporation, however, the
relationship is more complex. We can accentuate these complexities
by focusing on the influence of the various principals-the
shareholders-on the managers.
Pension Retail Hedge Mutual
Funds Investors Funds Funds
Directors / Managers
If we believe, as Anabtawi and Stout argue, 56 that shareholders
and other constituencies often have heterogeneous interests (even
though they may also share, in most cases, a desire to maximize
profits), then we can see the shareholders not as a single principal
with a unitary goal but as a group of independently minded
principals sharing a common agent. This common agency problem
creates several concerns. First, managers must deal with competing
(and perhaps conflicting) interests among influential shareholders.
To whom will they listen? Second, how will shareholders be able to
track and counter the influence of other shareholders with
competing views?
We may also note that SWFs and other large institutional
investors may have their own common agency concerns. For
56. Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 52.
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example, SWFs-the common agent-may be thought to have
multiple principals, as shown in the following paired possibilities:
Current Future
Citizens Citizens
Directors / Managers
Public Elites
Directors / Managers
Wealth Social
Maxi- Invest-
mization ment
Directors / Managers
To summarize, modern corporate law must deal with two
separate concerns: The first is the traditional agency-cost concern
that tries to monitor or bind management to limit the residual costs
of agent shirking or misappropriation.5 7 The second set of agency
costs-common agency costs-arise as shareholders must monitor or
57. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcoN.
305, 308-09 (1976) (popularizing the basic agency cost framework).
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bind other shareholders to limit the residual costs of their influence,
potential conflicts of interest, and potential misappropriation.58
The common agency problem is readily apparent in the context
of SWF investment, although as time passes some of these concerns
are somewhat allayed.5 9 In the early stages of conspicuous SWF
investment in U.S. markets-around the time of the financial
crisis-commentators focused particularly on the risk that
investments would be used for political purposes, rather than
financial or commercial purposes. 6 o In a seminal article, Robert
Kimmitt, Deputy Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Treasury,
described the primary issues as follows:
First, do [SWFs] perpetuate undesirable underlying
macroeconomic policies? Countries should not use them as a
mechanism to accumulate more foreign assets to avoid
exchange rate appreciation. Second, what is the potential
impact of these funds on financial stability? SWFs are in
principle long term, stable investors who can provide liquidity
to the markets. However, they also represent large,
concentrated-and often non-transparent-positions in
financial markets. Third, are SWF investment decisions made
on commercial grounds consistent with the free market
principles? Finally, do investment decisions by SWFs have
national security implications? 6 1
All of these concerns remain, although a web of federal
regulations and market constraints help mitigate some risks.62
Some of the concerns are monitored through high-level government
review of SWF transactions, 63 but some-such as whether SWFs
perpetuate harmful macroeconomic effects or pose risks to financial
stability-are not easily managed because they implicate the
political and economic calculations of a sovereign entity.64
58. Id.
59. Rose, Common Agency and the Public Corporation, supra note 53, at
1373.
60. Paul Rose, Sovereigns as Shareholders, 87 N.C. L. REv. 83, 93 (2008)
[hereinafter Rose, Sovereigns as Shareholders].
61. Robert M. Kimmitt, Opinion, Public Footprints in Private Markets, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 26, 2007) http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/26/opinion/26iht-
edkimmit.html.
62. Rose, Common Agency and the Public Corporation, supra note 53, at
1373.
63. Kimmitt, supra note 61.
64. Id. Notwithstanding the importance of these risks, this Article focuses
more narrowly on risks that SWFs pose to other investors. Some of these
concerns overlap, of course. For instance, if a SWF buys assets in an effort to
affect currency exchange rates, there is a potential risk of creating asset
2017] 901
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
There are good reasons to believe in the efficacy of the existing
network of regulations covering SWF investment. 65  Although
sovereign funds have been known to exert significant influence over
some corporate decision making, 66 there is no definitive evidence
that they have been used as political tools, at least with respect to
sovereign fund investment in the U.S. market6 7 Political use of
SWFs is not the only concern with SWF investment.
Other investors may not be concerned that SWFs will use their
investment power to act politically but that they will instead act as
"dumb money"-i.e., despite a large position in the company's stock,
the SWF determines that it should act passively in order to avoid
scrutiny by regulators in jurisdictions in which the SWF invests.68
This possibility has been described as the "passive investor
hypothesis" by Bortolotti, Megginson, and Votak, who show that
SWF investment is associated with an initial positive reaction but
then trends to negative market performance. 69 This effect could be
attributable to several possibilities, including suspicion over
political activities by the SWF.70 Alternatively, the hypothesis
bubbles. Adrian Blundell-Wignall et al., Sovereign Wealth and Pension Fund
Issues, FIN. MKT. TRENDS, 2008, at 117, 126.
65. Rose, Sovereigns as Shareholders, supra note 60, at 99.
66. Id. at 93-95.
67. There are good reasons for this, of course. The political economy of
SWF investment would suggest that the investment behavior of SWFs would
vary depending on the rules and political power of the country in which the
SWF is investing. Id. at 133. The size of the market also plays an important
factor. Imagine, for example, that a finance minister approaches an SWF
manager and demands that the SWF be used for a political purpose (perhaps to
invest in a particular company in order to acquire sensitive intellectual
property that could be strategically useful for national security purposes). To
carry out the investment, the SWF might need to engage in a series of
transactions intended to conceal the source of the funds, lest the regulators in
the target's home country prohibit the investor. The risk is that regulators will
eventually determine the source of the funds (and the ultimate controlling
entity behind the investment-the sovereign who wishes to acquire sensitive
intellectual property). This risk differs significantly, however, depending on the
country at issue. Suppose that the target company is in Belarus. Belarus's
market is much smaller than the United States, and the costs of being shut out
of that market are much smaller than being shut out of U.S. markets. In
addition, Belarus may have fewer political and economic weapons, compared to
the United States, that it could deploy to punish such behavior.
68. Bernardo Bortolotti, Veljko Votak & William L. Megginson, The
Sovereign Wealth Fund Discount: Evidence from Public Equity Investments, 28
REV. FIN. STUD. 2993, 2995 (2015).
69. Id. at 3017, 3025-26.
70. Bortolotti, Votak, and Megginson do find some support for this
possibility, as they note that larger positions and direct influence by the SWF
(for instance, by obtaining a board seat) seem to be related to poorer results. Id.
at 3000-01. This is not the case for Norway's SWF, however, suggesting that
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suggests that because SWFs invest passively, they do not provide
the kind of active monitoring of management that other investors
expect from large institutional investors. 71 As a result, SWFs risk
becoming deadweight shareholders, which provide no benefit to
other shareholders despite their (possibly) large holdings. Other
shareholders may sell because of the managerial agency costs
exacerbated by inert blockholding.
Ironically, this passivity is exactly the kind of result that would
please regulators, who are not concerned so much about market
performance as they are about the risk that SWFs would be used for
political purposes. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the
United States ("CFIUS"),72 the most frequent and direct regulator of
SWF investment in the United States, employs a fairly simple but
relatively effective method of regulating SWF investment. When a
foreign investor, such as a sovereign fund, decides to invest in the
United States, they are generally free to do so, provided that they
are not taking a controlling stake in a company that is linked to U.S.
national security interests.7 3 CFIUS depends on the voluntary filing
of notice of such a transaction with the committee, which then
conducts a review of and possibly an investigation into the
transaction. 74 If the transaction is deemed to create risks for U.S.
national security, the transaction may be blocked (or, if it has
already occurred, may be unwound).7 5
the governance structure of the SWF matters and, I would offer, that Norway's
influence tends to reflect the interests of many other large, institutional
investors.
71. Id.
72. CFIUS members are composed of the heads of the following
departments and offices: Department of the Treasury (chair), Department of
Justice, Department of Homeland Security, Department of Commerce,
Department of Defense, Department of State, Department of Energy, Office of
the U.S. Trade Representative, Office of Science & Technology Policy.
Composition of CFIUS, U.S. DEP'T TREASuRY (Dec. 1, 2010, 8:08 AM),
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/foreign-investment
/Pages/cfius-members.aspx.
73. Rose, Sovereigns as Shareholders, supra note 60, at 99.
74. Id. at 109.
75. This has occurred very infrequently over the course of the legislation's
history: "In 1990, just two years after Exon-Florio's passage, President Bush
required China National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation
("CATIC") to unwind its acquisition of Mamco, a Washington State-based
specialty airplane component manufacturer, in order to prevent CATIC from
acquiring sensitive technology. . . ." Paul Rose, The Foreign Investment and
National Security Act of 2007: An Assessment of Its Impact on Sovereign Wealth
Funds and State-Owned Enterprises 9 (Ohio State Pub. Law, Working Paper
No. 231, 2014), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2387562.
In [a transaction involving the Ralls Corporation], an entity controlled
by two persons alleged to have ties to the Chinese military acquired
2017] 903
WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW
As noted above, whether an investment falls under the watchful
gaze of CFJUS depends on whether the foreign investor acquires
"control" of the U.S. entity.76 The Treasury regulations under which
CFIUS operates define the term "control" fairly broadly:
[T]he power, direct or indirect, whether or not exercised, and
whether or not exercised or exercisable through the ownership
of a majority or a dominant minority of the total outstanding
voting securities of an issuer, or by proxy voting, contractual
arrangements or other means, to determine, direct or decide
matters affecting an entity.77
Because engagement in corporate governance creates some risk
that SWFs would be determining, directing, or deciding matters
affecting an entity, U.S. law appears to create a disincentive for
engagement in corporate governance.78 Thus, if a SWF invests in a
U.S. company with a connection to national security-say, Boeing-
but takes a minority stake and does not interfere in governance
matters, it will not run afoul of the regulations enforced by CFIUS.
On the other hand, if a Chinese SWF purchased eight percent of
Boeing, then pressured management to build a factory in Shenzhen,
the transaction would certainly draw the attention of CFIUS. But
aside from such obviously problematic transactions, what if a SWF
merely engages management on, for instance, its executive
compensation policies? Some SWFs (and most particularly,
Norway's SWF)79 do take such an active role in governance matters,
suggesting that some activities, carefully calibrated, can resolve the
tension between CFIUS-driven passivity and the need to engage in
corporate governance as a means to reduce managerial agency
costs.8 0
To clarify these issues with a question, to the extent that
concerns with sovereign fund investment cannot be managed by
four wind farm project companies that operated near sensitive
military and national security installations. Ralls acquired
controlling interests in the wind farms in March 2012, but did not file
a notice with CFIUS. Three months after the transaction closed, Ralls
finally notified CFIUS of the transaction. After reviewing then
investigating the transaction, CFIUS determined that mitigation was
not possible, and ordered divestment. In October 2012, President
Obama issued an executive order formally requiring Ralls to divest
ownership of the wind farms, as well as to remove all installations,
down to the concrete pads, within 14 days.
Id. at 19 n.51.
76. Rose, Sovereigns as Shareholders, supra note 60, at 99.
77. 31 C.F.R. § 800.204(a) (2017).
78. Rose, Sovereigns as Shareholders, supra note 60, at 93, 99.
79. Id. at 124-26.
80. Id. at 125-26.
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state-level enforcement (such as, in the United States, through the
review process provided by CFIUS)-and, indeed, may be
exacerbated by enforcement-what role is there for SWFs in
corporate governance? And more to the point, do sovereign
investors owe other investors some role in corporate governance? Do
they owe other investors a role in influencing management with
respect to environmental and social issues?
Although SWFs do not owe a duty to act as good corporate
citizens, sovereign investors should think in terms of responsibilities
they owe to other investors. The recognition of responsibilities flows
from the common agency problem at the heart of SWF equity
investment.81 As deep-pocketed and unusually powerful investors,
SWFs present particularly strong risks to investors who share a
common agent with the SWF.82 Regulation helps mitigate some of
these concerns, but not all host countries have similarly robust
regulations and protections for investors. 83 SWF responsibility to
other investors can help fill these gaps. 84
This softer formulation of responsibilities rather than duties
comes from a recognition that fiduciary duties must be accompanied
by enforcement of those duties, if we are to take them seriously.85 A
fiduciary duty without enforcement of that duty is a legal nullity,
and a beneficiary of the duty has only the good heart of the fiduciary
upon which to rely.8 6 A responsibility likewise places no enforceable
legal claim in the hands of beneficiaries, and the term does not
represent anything more than a moral claim. 87 But in the context of
SWFs, the power of responsibilities as moral claims should not be
underestimated, particularly when the fulfillment of such
responsibilities reinforces the legitimacy of the sovereign entity to
other investors and to its own citizens. Contrariwise, the failure to
fulfill responsibilities may raise questions about the legitimacy of
the sovereign entity, even if those affected are not the citizens of the
sovereign itself but co-investors in a portfolio company.
The following Part first provides a framework for thinking
about SWFs' responsibility as investors and then compares these
principles to the primary self-regulatory structure, the Santiago
Principles. As described below, the Santiago Principles help provide
a basic structure for thinking about SWF responsibilities to other
81. Rose, Common Agency and the Public Corporation, supra note 53, at
1373.
82. Id.
83. Rose, Sovereigns as Shareholders, supra note 60, at 127.
84. Id. at 130, 134.
85. Id. at 136.
86. Id. at 136 n.257.
87. Id. at 145.
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investors but also show themselves to be a relatively weak structure
even for such a modest task. It also describes how some SWFs go
beyond the Santiago Principles as they provide statements of
responsibility as investors through their own disclosure efforts.
III. BASIC TENETS OF SOVEREIGN FUND INVESTMENT
Using the idea of common agency costs as a starting point, one
can derive several crucial investment principles. First, investors
should be transparent in their investment purpose. This principle is
particularly important (and, admittedly, perhaps only important)
when the investor is able to exercise significant influence on the
corporate governance and corporate decision making of the portfolio
company.88 And while the principle may seem a radical departure
from the principle of selfish ownership described above, such
transparency of investment purpose has been a feature of U.S.
federal securities laws for decades.89  Under Schedule 13D,90
investors who acquire five percent or more of a public company's
securities must disclose, among other things, their identity, basic
background information, and the purpose of their investment,
including any plans or proposals that would change the
management of the company, its business or corporate structure, or
would result in an extraordinary corporate transaction. 91 Schedule
13D thus serves as an early-warning device for shareholders
concerned about changes in corporate control or even corporate
governance prerogatives. 92
Second, investors should be predictable in their investment
behavior. This is not to say that SWFs or other investors should
signal their intentions to buy or sell a particular stock, but merely
that their behavior should follow the patterns suggested by their
investment purpose. This is particularly true of SWFs and other
88. Id. at 144-45.
89. Id. at 142.
90. See Schedule 13D-Information to Be Included in Statements Filed
Pursuant to § 240.13d-1(a) and Amendments Thereto Filed Pursuant to
§ 240.13d-2(a), 17 C.F.R. § 240.13d-101 (2017).
91. Id.
92. See LLOYD S. HARMETZ & JARED D. KAPLAN, MORRISON & FOERSTER,
FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT SECTION 13(D) AND SECTION 13(G) OF THE
SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934, at 1 (2016) ("In many respects, Section 13(d)
acts as an early warning, signaling 'every large, rapid aggregation or
accumulation of securities, regardless of technique employed, which might
represent a potential shift in corporate control."' (citing GAF Corp. v. Milstein,
453 F.2d 709, 717 (2d Cir. 1971))).
906 [Vol. 52
SOVEREIGN FUNDS' RESPONSIBILITIES
large, potentially influential investors for whom the common agency
risks are much greater than for other investors.9 3
Finally, large investors arguably have a responsibility of
presence. By that term I mean that SWFs and other large
institutional investors should make their presence as engaged
investors apparent to management. This is not a call for SWFs to
become activist investors in the same manner as activist hedge
funds that seek board seats or even operational control; indeed,
doing so could create the risk that CFIUS would view the SWF as a
controlling (or at least dangerously influential) shareholder and
begin a review of the SWF's ownership in the portfolio company.
"Presence" is, however, a call for SWFs to become engaged investors.
The reason for this is simple: by remaining completely passive
investors with no voice, SWFs cede the floor to other investors who
are not shy about making their voices heard. 94 This is a detriment
not just to SWFs' beneficiaries but possibly to other investors and to
corporate governance generally. 95 As institutional investors that do
not have either short- or medium-term liabilities (like pension
funds) and theoretically enjoy extremely long-term investment
horizons (if they can be said to have any horizon at all), SWFs have
unique perspectives on long-term, patient capitalism.
As entities controlled by sovereigns, SWF may also have
perspectives on the long-term costs of various investment decisions,
such as the negative externalities created by certain investments.
To highlight this perspective, imagine an individual investor in a
coal mining company. In evaluating the investment, the individual
may look at potential liabilities facing the mining company-such as
potential environmental suits-but only needs to consider the
liabilities internalized by the company. Any negative externalities
that are not ultimately charged to the company will be borne by
others, including the government, and so are not priced into the
investment cost.
As a final point, SWFs would benefit from network effects of a
focus on reducing agency costs through transparency, predictability
and presence. As large investors with significant economic stakes in
many firms, SWFs also face the greatest financial risk from common
93. Rose, Common Agency and the Public Corporation, supra note 53, at
1373.
94. To put this in law school terminology, hedge funds are the "gunners" of
corporate governance. As Eugene Volokh has suggested, it seems odd-and
even hypocritical-for students to complain about other students "dominating
the class discussion" after they failed to take the opportunity to speak. Bitter
Success, Interview with Eugene Volokh, Un-American Legal Conspirator, BITTER
EMPIRE: BITTER LAw. (Jan. 11, 2010), http://bitterempire.com/eugene-volokh-un
-american-legal-conspirator/.
95. Rose, Sovereigns as Shareholders, supra note 60, at 120.
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agency problems caused by other large institutional investors, such
as hedge funds and other SWFs.
As sovereign entities, SWFs each have their own rules,
standards, and policies set out by the sovereign government. 96
However, they are obviously not directly regulated by other foreign
governments, except by operation of agreement, treaty, or as normal
market participants would be, such as, for instance, being subject to
reporting obligations regarding share ownership percentages. 97 But
because they are market actors while also sovereign entities with
the potential conflicts outlined above, SWFs suffered (and, to some
degree, perhaps still suffer) from a trust deficit. The creation of the
Santiago PrincipleS 98 undoubtedly was driven in large part by the
need to mitigate this trust deficit and thereby enjoy access to
markets without incurring large transaction costs. 99 Indeed, the
introduction to the Santiago Principles makes clear that "it will be
important to continue to demonstrate-to home and recipient
countries, and the international financial markets-that the SWF
arrangements are properly set up and investments are made on an
economic and financial basis."10 0  The Santiago Principles are
designed to encourage trust and investment according to the
following four core objectives:
96. Id. at 89.
97. See id.
98. See generally SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES, supra note 18.
99. Transaction costs, such as may be incurred through the CFIUS process,
may play a significant role in whether a SWF pursues a particular transaction:
If navigating the CFIUS process requires significant expenditures of effort by
the SWF and its attorneys, or if the SWF fears that the transaction may become
politicized, it may choose to invest elsewhere or to limit the scope of the
investment so as to avoid creating a risk that the transaction would be closely
investigated by CFIUS and, possibly, ultimately blocked. Some deal-making
behavior by SWFs may be characterized as a kind of regulatory arbitrage, as
SWFs limit investments to ownership levels so as to avoid CFIUS filings and
attention, securities regulations, or other regulations or internal governance
provisions that might trigger increased costs for the SWF. Transaction costs
also play another very important role in encouraging SWF passivity: they
encourage SWFs to avoid appearing political in their investment and
governance decisions. This may be viewed as "headline risk" for SWFs. SWFs
are already viewed with suspicion by many regulators, and publicity suggesting
that a sovereign is using its SWF for political purposes can have a profound
effect on the costs of SWF investment; alarmist portrayals of SWF investment
activity routinely ignore these headline risks and how they impact large,
diversified portfolios. Rose, Sovereign Investing and Corporate Governance,
supra note 2.
100. SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, at 4.
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i. To help maintain a stable global financial system and free
flow of capital and investment;
ii. To comply with all applicable regulatory and disclosure
requirements in the countries in which they invest;
iii. To invest on the basis of economic and financial risk and
return-related considerations; and
iv. To have in place a transparent and sound governance
structure that provides for adequate operational controls,
risk management, and accountability. 101
There are a number of principles within the Santiago Principles
that have bearing on other investors and can serve to limit common
agency costs. For example, Principle 4 states that "[t]here should be
clear and publicly disclosed policies, rules, procedures, or
arrangements in relation to the SWF's general approach to funding,
withdrawal, and spending operations." 102 Withdrawal policies may
be relevant to other investors because they may be concerned with a
sudden sell-off of the SWFs assets (and what that might do to the
short-term price of the assets).103 Principle 15 states that "SWF
operations and activities in host countries should be conducted in
compliance with all applicable regulatory and disclosure
requirements of the countries in which they operate." 104 Investors
have an interest in knowing not only that SWFs are complying with
applicable regulations but, relatedly, also that regulations are
enforced against SWFs to the same extent as against other
investors.105
Principle 16 states that "[t]he governance framework and
objectives, as well as the manner in which the SWF's management
is operationally independent from the owner, should be publicly
disclosed."10 6 Disclosure of the SWF's objectives and operational
independence is important to other investors because it helps
identify particular risks associated with sovereign investors
(provided the disclosure is complete and accurate, of course, which is
not a certainty). 107 Likewise, Principle 18 also prescribes disclosure:
"The SWF's investment policy should be clear and consistent with
its defined objectives, risk tolerance, and investment strategy, as set
by the owner or the governing body(ies), and be based on sound
portfolio management principles."1 08 Investment policy disclosure
101. Id.
102. Id. at 13.
103. Rose, Sovereigns as Shareholders, supra note 60, at 139-40.
104. SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, at 19.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 20.
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by SWFs is generally of poor quality, with a few notable exceptions,
such as the Australian Future Fund, the Alaska Permanent Fund,
and Norway's Government Pension Fund Global. 109 However, it is
steadily improving. 110
Principle 18 calls for transparency in investment policy.111
Among other things, the policy should address the use of external
managers and the SWF's financial risk exposure. SWFs vary widely
in how and what they disclose regarding investment policies, with
some giving detailed descriptions of risk preferences, benchmarks,
and principles on how external managers are selected1 12 but others
providing only a bare outline of investment policies and
procedures. 118
Principle 19 goes to the heart of regulators' and investors'
concerns with sovereign investment. The principle states that "[t]he
SWF's investment decisions should aim to maximize risk-adjusted
financial returns in a manner consistent with its investment policy,
and based on economic and financial grounds."1 4 Subprinciple 19.1.
qualifies Principle 19, however, stating that "if investment decisions
are subject to other than economic and financial considerations,
these should be clearly set out in the investment policy and be
publicly disclosed." 115 To date, no SWF has stated that it makes
investment decisions on a basis other than economic and financial
considerations. 116 Of those two terms-"economic" and "financial"-
109. Paul Rose, Public Fund Investment Policies: 2015 Annual Review 11
(Ohio State Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 313, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractjid=2676002 [hereinafter Rose, Public Fund
Investment Policies: 2015 Annual Review].
110. I have documented investment policy disclosures in several annual
publications, beginning in 2014. See Paul Rose, A Disclosure Framework for
Public Fund Investment Policies, 29 PROCEDIA EcoN. & FIN. 5, 6 (2015); Rose,
Public Funds Investment Policies: 2016 Survey, supra note 20, at 1-13; Rose,
Public Fund Investment Policies: 2015 Annual Review, supra note 109, at 1-12.
111. SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, at 20.
112. Id. at 20-21.
113. Id. at 21.
114. Id. at 22.
115. Id.
116. A recent survey of SWF self-assessments of compliance with the
Santiago Principles indicates that several SWFs have disclosed certain
economic considerations with which they are required to comply:
Most IFSWF members invest to maximise risk-adjusted returns
subject to their investment policy. Because the primary objective of
most funds is wealth management and growth, this objective is
consistent with their mandate to grow the wealth of the fund. Several
funds have a discrete economic or development mandate in addition to
an objective to generate solid financial performance. Ireland's ISIF,
Italy's CDP Equity, the RDIF in Russia, and the Palestine Investment
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"economic" is the more problematic if we believe, as Romberg states,
that "all economics is political." 117 At the very least, however,
disclosure by a SWF that it is going to act for strategic economic (or
political) reasons would provide other investors some information
needed to evaluate the risk and discount their investments
accordingly.
Under Principle 20, SWFs are admonished that they "should not
seek or take advantage of privileged information or inappropriate
influence by the broader government in competing with private
entities." 118 SWFs (or at least their government sponsors) have not
only informational advantages by virtue of their communications
with other government officials and regulators but also the ability to
create informational advantages.1 19 For instance, a SWF may invest
in company A, then, in concert with other governmental actors,
could conceivably bring a regulatory action against a competitor,
company B, or otherwise bar them from the SWF's home markets,
effectively driving down the price of company B and perhaps
boosting the price of company A. The SWF's knowledge of these
impending actions could enable them to both profit on a long
position in company A and a short position in company B.
Finally, Principle 21 states that
SWFs view shareholder ownership rights as a fundamental
element of their equity investments' value. If an SWF chooses
to exercise its ownership rights, it should do so in a manner
that is consistent with its investment policy and protects the
financial value of its investments. The SWF should publicly
disclose its general approach to voting securities of listed
entities, including the key factors guiding its exercise of
ownership rights. 120
Although many SWFs are relatively passive when exercising their
shareholder rights,121 some have been active both in merger
negotiations (such as Qatar's involvement in Glencore's bid for
Fund all share such a mandate, as does one of the sub-funds of
Nigeria's NSIA.
Trends in Transparency: Santiago Principle Self-Assessments 2016, INT'L F.
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS, http://www.ifswf.org/trends-transparency-santiago
-principle-self-assessments-2016 (last visited Oct. 25, 2017).
117. Alan D. Romberg, All Economics Is Political: ECFA Front and Center,
32 CHINA LEADERSHIP MONITOR, Spring 2010, at 1, 13.
118. SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, at 22.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 23.
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Xstratal 22) or they have engaged in extensive discussion with
portfolio companies over matters of corporate governance (such as
Norway's Government Pension Fund Global's focus on executive
compensation). 123 Again, there is no evidence that SWFs have used
their shareholder power in a way that is inconsistent with Principle
21, at least with respect to their investments in Western markets.
This may have to do as much with the risks of doing so (such as the
political risk of upsetting a politically powerful host country and the
higher transaction costs necessary to access those markets after
inappropriate investment behavior), as it does with SWFs
affirmatively determining to comply with Principle 21.
To summarize these guidelines, the Santiago Principles
encourage SWFs to be independent from political interference by the
sponsor government, apolitical (or, at least, disclose if the SWF is
not going to be), law abiding, and otherwise consistent with a
financial orientation that seeks to maximize risk-adjusted financial
gains. 124 SWFs show a wide variety of approaches both in how they
govern themselves and how-or even whether-they disclose their
policies. 125 This variability makes managing common agency costs
somewhat challenging. Although most funds behave in relatively
stable ways with respect to the exercise of shareholder rights,126 for
example, the differences in approaches means that other investors
cannot rely on SWFs to fit a particular model of behavior. In other
words, some SWFs may behave like mutual funds, which tend not to
be engaged in governance for a variety of reasons, while others may
behave like public pension funds, which tend to be more willing to
engage on matters of governance. 127
122. One report noted: "It is therefore something of a watershed moment
when an SWF acts like an activist shareholder, which is precisely what Qatar
did when it rejected Glencore's offer. 'The transformation was likely inevitable
once the sovereign wealth funds began to invest directly in companies,' says
Leonard Schneidman, Managing Director of WTAS, a tax, valuation and
financial advisory firm. 'They can no longer work solely behind the scenes or
pursue their objectives via intermediary entities,' adds Schneidman." Richard
Levick, Game-Changer: Qatar Plays Historic Role in Glencore's Bid for Xstrata,
FORBES (Sep. 12, 2012, 7:23 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/richardlevick
/2012/09/12/game-changer-qatar-plays-historic-role-in-glencores-bid-for-xstrata
/#184cfc40607b. Contra Rose, Sovereign Investing and Corporate Governance,
supra note 2, at 945-46 (offering a different view on whether Qatar was really
an "activist" investor or simply an engaged shareholder trying to make sure it
received a fair deal).
123. Norway's Sovereign Fund to Focus on High Executive Pay: FT, REUTERS
(May 1, 2016, 6:23 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-norway-swf
-idUSKCNOXS1MO.
124. SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES, supra note 18, at 23.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. The SovereigNET/IFSWF report on self-assessments notes that
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IV. How EFFECTIVE ARE SWFs IN COMPLYING WITH COMMON
AGENCY COST-REDUCING SANTIAGO PRINCIPLES?
In this Part, the Article reviews how three different SWFs have
assessed their own compliance with the Santiago Principles. Again,
this is important to show how SWFs impact common agency costs
because, as noted above, the Santiago Principles serve as a means to
limit common agency costs insofar as they encourage transparency
and predictability. 128 If the good news is that some of the common
agency concerns raised by sovereign investment may be mitigated
by the Santiago Principles, the bad news is that most funds do a
poor job in complying with them, at least in terms of what they
disclose. 129 In general, the self-assessments reaffirm the concern
noted earlier: SWFs vary widely in their governance practices and in
how and what they disclose. 130
A. Abu Dhabi Investment Authority
The Abu Dhabi Investment Authority ("ADIA") is one of the
largest SWFs in the world, boasting nearly $800 billion in assets. 131
In the fund's recent self-assessment, ADIA provided extensive
disclosures on how it complies with the Santiago Principles. 132
When describing who "owns" the fund, ADIA discloses that "the
natural resources and wealth . .. are the public property of Abu
Dhabi." 133  ADIA's Investment Services Department ensures
adherence to local laws and disclosure requirements as well as
[m]ost funds exercise voting rights directly as shareholders for
economic and financial reasons. Of these funds, the Future Fund,
CIC, NZSF, the RDIF, and Alaska's APF each share publicly how they
exercise shareholder rights. ADIA reports that it does not exercise
voting rights unless it believes it must protect its financial interests or
those of shareholders as a body. SOFAZ and Chile's SWFs indicate
that they do not exercise shareholder rights or they take a neutral
position. Mexico's BSIF and PIF in Palestine do not have shareholder
policies. In Trinidad and Tobago, the HSF does not disclose its policy,
while Botswana and Nigeria's sovereign funds rely on their external
managers to exercise voting rights by proxy.
Trends in Transparency: Santiago Principle Self-Assessments 2016, supra note
116.
128. They do not, however, encourage "presence," as some SWFs may feel
that excessive engagement may actually trigger regulatory scrutiny. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See Fund Rankings, SWFI, http://www.swfinstitute.org/fund-rankings/
(last visited Oct. 25, 2017).
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supports ADIA in exercising shareholder rights and obligations,
including voting rights.1 34 The fund also provides an annual report,
discloses its investment objectives, and publicly discloses how ADIA
is operationally independent from political control. 1 3 5
ADIA's self-assessment is laudable in its extensive discussion of
investment policy, asset allocation, and external management
selection.136 The fund also describes how its investment decisions
are based "solely on its economic objectives of delivering sustained
long-term financial returns and aims to maximize risk-adjusted
financial returns."137
Finally, ADIA explains how, because it is independent from the
government, it has no access to privileged information. 13 8 In its
discussion of compliance with Principle 21, it notes that it "exercises
its voting rights . . . to protect its interests or to oppose motions that
may be detrimental to shareholders as a body."1 39 It does not
attempt to control or inappropriately influence portfolio companies
and has a practice of avoiding active management of portfolio
companies.1 40 ADIA makes appropriate ex ante disclosures related
to stock trading as well as ex post disclosures related to investment
thresholds, all of which assist other investors in assessing the risks
ADIA may pose as a co-investor sharing a common agent.141
B. China Investment Corporation
China Investment Corporation is another of the largest SWFs in
the world, also with over $800 billion in assets.142 In comparison to
ADIA's disclosure, CIC's is much sparser. CIC notes that it is a
''responsible investor" that abides by the laws of China and recipient
countries and conscientiously fulfills corporate social
responsibilities.1 43 The fund also notes that its "approach to exercise
shareholder ownership rights is consistent with its investment
principles as mentioned above and aims to protect and maximize its
financial interests of its investments."1 44
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As a general matter, CIC's self-assessment does not provide
much disclosure itself but instead refers to existing documents, such
as its annual report. 145 However, despite the fact that CIC's annual
report is a sophisticated, glossy publication, it does not provide
much detail on the inner workings of the fund; even incorporating
all of CIC's disclosures by reference, CIC's disclosures provide little
that would help other investors assess CIC's risk as a co-principal. 146
This is especially problematic because CIC may be viewed by some
investors as presenting greater risks as a common principal.1 47 As a
primary economic and political rival to the United States, there is a
risk that CIC's investments may be politicized by U.S. regulators
and, potentially, a risk that CIC could be used for political purposes
by China.1 48 The same may be said of other regulators and the
CIC's investments in Europe, Africa, and Asia.
C. Australia Future Fund
Like ADIA, the Australia Future Fund provided extensive
disclosures; indeed, the disclosures were as detailed as any self-
assessment.149 The Future Fund provided extensive discussion of
the fund's governance structures; how investment decisions are
made; the fund's approach to environmental, social, and governance
issues; the type of investments the fund will and will not consider;
and the fund's obligation to act as a prudent investor that seeks to
maximize risk-adjusted returns.15 0
While most funds rightly try to demonstrate independence from
politics, the Future Fund recognizes that even if it acts apolitically,
it still operates as a sovereign fund whose behavior reflects on the
Australian government.1'1 To that effect, the self-assessment
discloses that "legislation requires the Board of Guardians to act in
a way that is unlikely to cause any diminution of the Australian
Government's reputation in international financial markets."1 52
The Future Fund also responds to common agency concerns in a
very direct way by providing a detailed statement of ownership and
voting-rights expectations as well as reporting on how voting rights
have been exercised.153
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CONCLUSION
What do sovereign investors owe to other investors? This
Article suggests that although in most cases SWFs do not owe direct
duties to other investors, SWFs can limit the common agency costs
faced by other investors by providing adequate disclosures and
behaving predictably. Additionally, as large investors that often
control significant blocks of shares, SWFs should accept a
responsibility to be engaged, active investors. As noted above, this
is not a call to be an activist in a way that would trigger a review by
regulators such as CFIUS but simply a call to defend the interests of
other long-term investors and the governments and citizens for
whom the fund is operated. Common agency costs are a part of
modern corporate governance; hedge funds, for example, will often
invest in a company in order to pressure it to pay a dividend, split
off a division, merge with another entity, or otherwise provide a
liquidity event for investors. 154 In some cases, these decisions may
have a detrimental effect on the long-term prospects of the
company.1 5 s Rather than being inert, "dumb money," SWFs can add
their voice to these important, strategic discussions.
The Santiago Principles provide a framework for SWFs to
disclose important aspects of their governance and investment
processes and thereby limit common agency costs. Too often,
however, SWFs fail to fully embrace the call for transparency set out
in the Santiago Principles. As evidenced by the recent self-
assessments provided by a large number of SWFs, some funds
provide detailed disclosures that help reduce potential common
agency costs. Others, however, simply provide a "check-the-box"
disclosure that leaves many questions unanswered. Although the
self-assessments of a handful of SWFs show them to be transparent,
predictable, and present in corporate governance matters, they also
put in stark relief the relative deficiencies of many other SWFs.
154. See Martin Lipton, Dealing with Activist Hedge Funds and Other
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